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Essay 
THE FAILURE OF THE RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT UNDER 
SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 
WILLIAM W. VAN ALsTYNEt 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.! 
The generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment are so indetermi-
nate as to what state actions are forbidden that this Court has 
found it a ready instrument, in one field or another, to magnify 
federal, and incidentally its own, authority over the states. . .. 
There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a 
substantial proportion of our [decisions respecting what the states 
mayor may not do consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment] 
would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infalli-
ble, but we are infallible only because we are final? 
[T]his act reverses the Supreme Court's decision Employment 
Division against Smith . . .. 3 
t William R. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University (with appreciation to 
Erika King for research and editorial assistance). 
1. U.s. CONST. amend. X. 
2. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 534, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). 
3. President's Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 
2 PUB. PAPERS 2000 (Nov. 16, 1993). The text of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994), is reprinted infra as an Appendix. 
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Suppose at the outset of a state criminal homicide prosecu-
tion, the defendant moves to exclude incriminating evidence4 the 
police had found in an open field on his property, just inside the 
fence. In moving to suppress, the defendant relies on the Fourth 
AmendmentS as applied to the states via the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 He submits that, because the 
police enter~d the field without a search warrant, the "fruits of the 
search," i.e., the gun, must be suppressed. The State demurs on 
the ground that no warrant was required to search the field-the 
defendant is simply mistaken in suggesting otherwise.' The state 
court, however, accepts the defendant's view that the Supreme 
Court case supporting the State's position has been called into 
serious question.8 Admitting the issue is uncertain, the state court 
nonetheless rules in the defendant's favor. It therefore grants the 
motion to suppress. 
Following ineffective interlocutory appeal by the State through 
the state courts, the case then arrives, via petition of the State, at 
the United States Supreme Court, to review the critical state court 
ruling on the Fourth Amendment question. The Supreme Court 
reverses in an opinion by the Chief Justice (seven justices concur-
4. Such evidence might be, for example, the discarded gun used to kill the victim 
(as confirmed in ballistic tests), which is registered to the defendant and bears powder 
traces exactly matching traces found on the defendant's hand. 
5. The Fourth Amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, suppOl1ed by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
6. For the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause makes 
applicable to the states the Fourth Amendment provisions regarding searches and sei-
zures, the defendant rightly relies on Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), and Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
7. The State notes that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to open fields, 
whether fenced or not, citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (Holmes, J.) 
("[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 
'persons, houses, papers, and effects: is not extended to the open fields."). 
8. Most notably, perhaps, by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (hold-
ing that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement does extend to surreptitious wire-
tapping of ordinary pay phones, and declaring that the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple, not places). 
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ring, one dissenting) and remands the case for trial. It holds that 
no warrant was required.9 The Court sums up: 
A state court does not deprive a person of liberty "without due 
process" merely by admitting evidence against him which was 
found by police in the course of an open field search. The State 
commits no constitutional wrong under the Fourth Amendment 
in having acquired evidence in this manner, for we hold the 
Fourth Amendment is inapplicable in these circumstances. So, 
too, the State commits no constitutional wrong under the Four-
teenth Amendment, which merely applies the Fourth Amendment 
equally to the states. Accorc;lingly, the state law (here, its law of 
criminal procedure) governing the admissibility of such evidence 
does not as applied infringe any due process right of the accused. 
The decision below is reversed, the judgment vacated, and the 
case remanded for trial. 
Against the background of this clear holding from the Court, 
we now turn to an act of Congress that presumes to dictate the 
opposite outcome-i.e., an act directing the exclusion of the in-
criminating evidence in the remanded state court proceedings,1O 
despite the State's successful appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Enacted the year following the Supreme Court's decision, the 
act reflects Congress' disapproval of any state that would presume 
to take seriously-much less in any way rely on-the view of the 
Supreme Court (rather than the dissent) as a "correct" statement 
of "the law." Congress first expresses its disdain for the Supreme 
Court's opinion and, having done so, moves to enact the dissent, 
recast in the following words: 
No court of any state shall admit as evidence in any civil or 
criminal proceeding anything taken from any field owned by one 
who has not consented to its search, absent a warrant issued by a 
neutral magistrate on a finding of probable cause. 
The obvious question promptly presents itself. For at once the 
State wants to know on what basis Congress presumes to com-
mand its courts and dictate its rules of evidence in this way.u 
9. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1984) (reaffirming the holding 
in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924), and declining to confer Fourth Amend-
ment sanctuary on open fields remote from houses). 
10. And the consequent release of the person charged with homicide (because of the 
compelled suppression of the most critical evidence tending to establish his guilt). 
11. The question raised by the State concerns the entitlement of Congress to set 
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Note that the state presenting this question is not interested in 
whether Congress might prescribe such a rule merely to govern 
the admissibility of evidence in the federal courtsP It readily rec-
ognizes that pursuant to provisions in Article TIl of the Constitu-
tion and the Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I, Congress 
aside the Supreme Court's authoritative adjudication of the Due Process Clause, and to 
mandate that, instead, all state courts (and presumably then all federal courts examining 
the state court conviction on collateral attack) shall treat the case just reviewed as 
though it involved a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, though none of these 
courts would otherwise so conclude. The State, in raising this question, does nothing at 
all remarkable. The Supreme Court readily recognizes the legitimacy of the inquiry. See 
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89 (1907) ("[T]he proposition that there are legislative 
powers ... not expressed in the grant of powers [to Congress], is in direct conflict with 
the doctrine that this is a government of enumerated powers."); United States v. Fisher, 
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 395 (1805) ("[U]nder a constitution conferring specific powers, the 
power contended for must be granted, or it cannot be exercised."); 2 ELLIOrr's DE-
BATES 489 (2d ed. 1836) (comments of James Wilson regarding Pennsylvania's adoption 
of the Constitution) ("If a law should be made inconsistent with those powers vested by 
this instrument in Congress, the judges, as a consequence of their independence, and the 
particular powers of government being defined, will declare such law to be null and 
void .... "). 
12. Similarly, to the extent the RFRA itself merely prescribes a rule of construction 
regarding the manner in which other acts of Congress are to be applied, it is unre-
markable. It is simply of no consequence why Congress prescribes a rule specifying how 
its own statutes are to be applied. Specifically, whether Congress so provided merely 
from political desire to ingratiate itself (or its incumbent members) with various religious 
organizations, for example, or even from a view that the spirit of the First Amendment 
is somehow best served by exempting one class of citizens from laws that all others must 
obey, is not a critical or even relevant issue for the courts. For the courts, rather, it is 
quite enough that Congress has the power to enact such a provision (which it doubtless 
does) and that, as enacted-solely to declare how federal statutes are to be affected-the 
RFRA does not so favor religion as to run afoul of the Establishment Clause (or the 
implied Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment). See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. 
of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (dicta sustaining the RFRA merely as a direc-
tive by Congress regarding the manner in which acts of Congress shall be applied, find-
ing this within congressional authority under the Constitution). 
For suggestions that such purely religious exemptions from laws binding on all 
others are not easily reconcilable with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
and the implied Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see Welsh v. United 
States, 398 U.S. 333, 344-67 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 
U.S. 664, 694-700 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 
418-23 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). A majority of the Court, however, treats them as 
permissible, albeit within certain limits. Compare Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 
432 U.S. 63, 72, 81, 85 (1977) (holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by 
calling for reasonable rather than absolute accommodation and extending that require-
ment to all religious beliefs and practices rather than protecting only Sabbath observance, 
is an anti-discrimination law rather than an endorsement of religion and therefore is valid 
under the Establishment Clause), with Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 
710-11 (1985) (striking, on Establishment Clause grounds, a Connecticut statute that pro-
vided Sabbath observers with an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath). 
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may prescribe such rules of evidence, generally, as it thinks appro-
priateP All concede, however, that Congress is given no such 
power in respect to the states, their rules of evidence, or their 
COurts.14 
After conceding this general point when the case is on re-
mand to the trial court, counsel for the defendant says the follow-
ing: 
The answer to that question is ... that the power to adopt this 
act requiring this court to exclude the evidence in question . . . 
well, it comes from the last section of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment itself. And insofar as Congress is given this kind of power 
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and has ex-
ercised it to prevent this court from considering this evidence, its 
act forbidding consideration of this evidence is necessarily enti-
tled to control in the state courts pursuant to the Supremacy 
Clause in Article VI. 
Well, we quite agree with defense counsel as to the Suprem-
acy Clause in Article VI. But, of course, that clause is not the 
source of Congress' power to have adopted this (or any other) 
act.1S As to that, we must look to the other part of the answer 
provided. Puzzled by counsel's response, but interested to see 
whether he could possibly be correct, we turn to the section of the 
Constitution that he has invoked for the act of Congress, and we 
read it. This is what Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment says: 
13. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.ll (1959) ("Congress has the 
power to prescribe rules of procedure for the federal courts, and has from the earliest 
days exercised that power. . . . The power of this Court to prescribe rules of procedure 
and evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of Con-
gress."). And whether Congress puts the explanation for its rules of evidence on the 
ground of mere policy preference rather than anything more profound (such as a belief 
that they-or some of them-are constitutionally required) is, for the courts, really nei-
ther here nor there. There are, of course, limits to Congress' power to prescribe proce-
dures and rules of evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 
(1872), but none would be implicated by a rule of the sort here. 
14. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) ("[T]he Consti-
tution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the 
States to govern according to Congress' instructions."). 
15. Rather, Article VI merely provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Con-
stitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." (emphasis added). 
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The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.16 
And the question immediately prompts itself: What "provision," if 
any, of "this article," does this act of Congress merely "en-
force"?17 
It may be the case-indeed, it probably is the case-that the 
clause commits to Congress the authority to provide for the pun-
ishment of local law enforcement personnel who conduct unlawful 
searches and seizures (i.e., those pursued in disregard of Fourth 
Amendment restrictions applicable to the states by force of Sec-
tion 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment). Such a law, were it adopt-
ed by Congress, might well forcefully illustrate what it means to 
say (as Section 5 does say) that Congress shall have power to 
"enforce" (i.e., compel observance of) that which the Fourteenth 
Amendment enjoins.18 And, in order to further deter unlawful 
searches and seizures, possibly Congress could, by statute, forbid 
the state's use of evidence wrongly obtained by the police (Le., 
obtained by means that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
disallow). 
Here, however, Congress has done neither of these things, nor 
anything even faintly like them. Rather, Congress has claimed no 
less than an authority to review the Supreme Court for constitu-
tional error. This is the power Congress now claims: 
Whether or not the Supreme Court is of the view that the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid open field searches ab-
sent consent of the owner or a warrant issued by a neutral mag-
istrate on a showing of probable cause, we think (or at least we 
are prepared to declare) that it would be a better interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment if it did. And we shall treat the 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
17. That is, what provision does the act merely compel the state scrupulously to 
respect (or hold the state accountable for failing to respect)? The standard dictionary def-
inition of "enforce" is merely "[tlo compel observance of or obedience to." AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 610 (3d ed. 1992). The same term, "enforce," appears in match-
ing clauses of several other amendments as well. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, § 2; 
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIX; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 2. 
18. Indeed, there is a federal statute that does authorize the federal prosecution of 
state or local police in these circumstances-and, to be sure, it was adopted by Congress 
pursuant to Section 5. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994). 
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Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, as if it did. In our view, that 
is a far better proposition than that which the opinion of the 
Supreme Court happens to reflect. We think ourselves as much 
entitled to measure the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
coverage as are the members of the Supreme Court and, insofar 
as we deem it appropriate, by suitable legislation adopted for the 
purpose, we may render the Supreme Court's opinion altogether 
moot. 
Moreover, there is a significant advantage to our under-
standing of the power vested in us by Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. For it is only through our understanding that 
we can gain a rightful authority to override a much larger num-
ber of state laws, and further magnify federal authority over the 
states, as well as to override unacceptable decisions by the Su-
preme Court. Thus, our understanding of our superior role vis-a-
vis the Supreme Court, as vested in us pursuant to Section 5, is 
this: it enables us to review decisions of the Supreme Court as a 
super-Supreme Court and to say wherein the Supreme Court has 
erred in sustaining some state law or state practice as one that is 
not forbidden by Section 1. When, moreover, a case arises that 
draws into question whether a given state practice does or does 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court says it 
does not, but we say it should nevertheless be deemed to do so, 
declaring our superseding and superior power to proceed in this 
fashion pursuant to Section 5, courts shall yield to our view and 
decide the case accordingly. For if the state statute is in conflict 
with our interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as we have 
presumed to declare it by law, the case shall be brought speedily 
to an end-decided as this Congress decrees shall be done.19 
297 
19. Compare this hypothetical language to strikingly parallel provisions in the RFRA. 
In § 2000bb(a)(5), Congress asserts its strong preference for a different First and Four-
teenth Amendment standard-~>ne it deems more suitable "for striking sensible balances 
between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests"-than the Supreme 
Court has determined either amendment requires of a state. Compare RFRA 
§ 2000bb-1(b) (protecting the free exercise of religion from governmental burden unless 
such restriction furthers a "compelling governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that . . . interest") with Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
878-79 (1990) (holding that a law whose objective is not to prohibit the free exercise of 
religion does not violate the First Amendment, even though the incidental effects of "a 
generally applicable and otherwise valid provision" do restrict free exercise). In the sec-
tions that follow, Congress then presumes to prohibit any state law that does not satisfy 
the standard it sets out, a standard that "substitutes" for the less restrictive test that the 
Court has declared to be, in the Court's view, all that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require. See RFRA §§ 2000bb-1, 2000bb-3; see also Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 
1018, 1019, 1021 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[The RFRA] thus seeks to return the 
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Put more succinctly, Congress reads Section 5 to say: 
Whatever Congress may declare to be inconsistent with any other 
clause in this amendment, any opinion of the Supreme Court or 
any other court notwithstanding, Congress may forbid to the 
States. 
Of course Section 5 does not read this way or anything like it. 
Nor is it imaginable that were it recast in this fashion, it could 
have emerged from Congress as a serious proposal-whether in 
1866 or today-and much less is it imaginable that it would have 
been ratified (or would now be ratified) by any state.20 It is a 
courts . . . to the approach they had taken before Smith. . . • The motivation behind the 
[RFRA] was in fact disagreement with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitu-
tion." (emphasis added»; Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the ReligiollS 
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEx. L. REv. 209, 219 (1994) (declaring that the RFRA "is 
designed to restore . . . rights that Congress believes should exist if the Constitution 
were properly interpreted" (emphasis added), which, of course, Laycock and Thomas 
think, in Smith, it was not, and that, to overrule Smith, Congress enacted the RFRA). 
The RFRA does not stand on a more modest claim (sometimes made) that it is merely 
an appropriate measure to prevent otherwise-difficult-to-prove violations of the First or 
Fourteenth Amendment (nor is it limited in any manner of speaking to any such kinds 
of cases, whatever one might fancy them to be). Cf. Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, 
and the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV. 145, 166 (1995); Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 
1352, 1359 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 
95-2074). See also infra text accompanying notes 50-62. 
20. That such a proposal would not have passed in Congress, let alone have been 
ratified by the requisite number of states, is implicit in the rejection of H.R. 63, CONGo 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033 (1866), an early draft of Section 1 introduced in Feb-
ruary of 1866 by Representative Bingham of Ohio. See id. That proposed amendment 
itself did not presume to go nearly as far as the approach described above, yet even it 
was deemed unacceptable, even in Congress. Bingham's failed draft would merely have 
provided that: 
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal 
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property. 
Id. at 1034. 
Two sorts of objections were raised by the opponents of this Congress-empowering 
proposal. First, the rights contained therein were not self-executing. Absent Congressional 
action, there would be nothing for the courts to apply. In other words, the amendment 
would be meaningless, except insofar as Congress provided affirmative legislation (which it 
could of course repeal at any time). Second, the proposed amendment at the same time 
would commit too much intrusive power to Congress by providing Congress with the 
power to OllSt state legislative jurisdiction to whatever extent it might presume to see fit. 
See, e.g., id. at 1063-66, 1094 (remarks of Rep. Hale (New York»; id. at 1095 (remarks 
of Rep. Hotchkiss (New York»; id. app. at 133-35 (remarks of Rep. Rogers (New Jer-
sey»; cf. CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 115-16 (1872) (remarks of Rep. 
Farnsworth (Illinois». 
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breathtaking assertion of bootstrap authority, an utter trivialization 
of federalism and of the Tenth Amendment. 
The Tenth Amendment merely made explicit what was other-
wise understood by the doctrine of enumerated powers-that Con-
gress may make laws overriding state laws, but it may do so only 
to the extent it is granted express authority to do so, and not 
beyond?1 However, where a state law neither makes nor threat-
ens an interference with any right each person has against a state 
under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment (whether it be a 
right to a fair trial or, as here, a right to be free from searches 
and seizures not complying with the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment-a matter each state concedes to be ultimately for 
the Supreme Court to decide despite its fervent position that the 
Court is mistaken), there is nothing in the grant of powers made 
to Congress (and assuredly nothing in Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment) authorizing Congress to instruct a state and its courts 
to ignore state law and instead to conduct judicial proceedings 
merely as Congress thinks more suitable. 
Consideration of the proposal was postponed. The provision in H.R. 127, CONGo 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2265, 2286 (1866), that was subsequently to become Section 
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment took, of course, a different form-8ection 1 to be self-
executing ("No state shall • . . . ") and Section 5 simply allowing enforcement by Con-
gress. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 68--71, 128--29 (1986); 
ROBERT J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 34-50 (1960); JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE 
FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 86, 189 (1956); Alexander M. Bickel, The 
Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. Cr. REv. 79, 97 [hereinafter Bickel, The Voting Rights 
Cases]; Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 
HARv. L. REv. 1, 29-56 (1955); Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: 
Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 V AND. L. REv. 1539, 
1578--85, 1589-96, 1598, 1616-24 (1995); Michael P. Zuckert, Congressional Power Under 
the Fourteenth Amendment-The Original Understanding of Section 5, 3 CONST. COM-
MENT. 123, 134-44 (1986). 
21. Indeed, a broader power in Congress to override state laws was unequivocally 
rejected during the Constitutional Convention. Well into the summer of 1787, Madison 
championed a proposal that Congress would have a "negative" on state laws. See, e.g., 
Letter from James Madison to George Washington (April 16, 1787), reprinted in II 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 346-49 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). This national "veto" 
power residing in Congress was rejected on July 17, 1787, essentially for being too direct 
an interference with the legislative processes and prerogatives of the states. See II THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 27-28 (Max Farrand ed., 1937). The 
document that emerged from Philadelphia in September contained no trace of Madison's 
proposed congressional veto. 
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B. 
The case we have just examined is no different than were 
Congress alternatively, or additionally, to prescribe by federal law 
that "no state shall provide for the trial of any person charged 
with a violation of any of its criminal statutes by a jury consisting 
of fewer than twelve persons" -though the state law might itself 
provide for a jury of, say, six, or eight, rather than twelve. Must 
each state now comply with this act of Congress, alter its practice, 
accept the additional costs, and empanel only juries conforming to 
the congressional demand? There is no basis on which it should 
feel so obliged. The reason is exactly the same as in the case we 
just examined, namely, no authority is granted to Congress to 
demand any such condition as this, and certainly none at all under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Congress may believe that persons accused of various crimes 
ought to have all manner of extra, constitutionally unrequired, 
protections when subjected to criminal trial in state court-whether 
those protections be, for example, a twelve-person jury,22 or rep-
resentation by "no fewer than two counsel" rather than one.23 A 
state may itself agree as a matter of policy, and may surely choose 
to so provide, by statute or in its constitution. But of course it 
need not. And, in not agreeing, it may make different provisions 
with respect to its criminal trials-with no suggestion that, in so 
doing, it in any way acts contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. 
And, indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly assured each 
state that this is so, declaring that the "due process of law" does 
not require twelve-person juries. Rather, it requires only that no 
22. Or perhaps, for that matter, a fourteen-person jury. Note that the theory pursuant 
to which Congress claims power to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment'S Due Process 
Clause is that Section 5 provides Congress not merely ample authority to ensure that 
every state meets its due process obligations (clearly the point of giving power to Con-
gress, in Section 5, to "enforce" the article "by appropriate legislation")-but also author-
ity to require the states to go beyond any and all measures deemed sufficient by the 
Supreme Court to bring the state into full compliance with the Due Process Clause. And 
if that is so, it seems merely to be a matter of congressional determination to say "how 
much more" the state must do. For example, if twelve is "better" due process than six, 
surely fourteen may be even "better" due process than twelve? 
23. And, again, it may be able so to provide with respect to all federal criminal 
trials. With respect to prescribing the conditions of such purely federal trials, Congress is 
not limited merely to providing that they be conducted in a manner not inconsistent with 
the constitutional guarantees of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. See supra text 
accompanying notes 12-13. 
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state criminal trial jury shall consist of fewer than six jurors.24 An 
act of Congress mandating that each state must nevertheless em-
panel larger juries to conduct felony trials-juries of no fewer than 
twelve persons-cannot be said to be legislation "authorized" by 
Section 5, for such legislation "enforces" nothing required by any 
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment according to the Supreme 
COurt.25 
What, then, does this act do? It overreaches congressional 
authority by presuming to mandate a policy which Congress might 
wish each state to adopt, but which each state obviously need not 
adopt in order to be in full compliance with the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It is, at best, a proposal-one that Congress may 
very well encourage,26 but one that it has no constitutional basis 
24. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978). 
25. By way of contrast, an act so doing-that is, an act of Congress actually (and 
merely) "enforcing" the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to trial by a jury of 
no fewer than six persons-would be an act that provided a secure means of overturning 
any conviction obtained with a jury of fewer than that minimum number. And, to be 
sure, there is such an act. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1994) (federal habeas avail-
able in just this way). It might also be an act that provided for civil damages against the 
offending state personnel, or even against the state as such. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 
1985, 1986 (1994). Nor would the Eleventh Amendment bar Congress from providing that 
remedy directly against the state in federal court. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 
456 (1976). It might be an act that imposed federal criminal sanctions against state offi-
cials who knowingly denied this Fourteenth Amendment right to an accused. See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1994) (criminal sanctions applicable in such a case); Ex parte Virgin-
ia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-49 (1879) (sustaining federal prosecution of state judge for exclud-
ing black citizens from petit and grand jury service). It could even include an act that 
provided for the immediate removal into federal court of any case wherein the accused 
would be unable to "enforce" that right. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 
303, 311-12 (1879). The point of these examples is that Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does, indeed, grant to Congress considerable authority to secure to each 
person every right the Supreme Court agrees is furnished by Section 1. Indeed, it autho-
rizes Congress to put federal armed forces at the disposal of the President to assure that 
federal court orders respecting the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment as de-
clared by the Supreme Court shall not be obstructed or ignored by state governments-it 
authorizes enforcement with very real "teeth." See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 12 
(1958) (mentioning, in a case upholding a federal court desegregation order, the 
President's use of federal troops to enforce that order (implicitly approved by Congress». 
26. To be sure, Congress may provide such "encouragement" by qualifying the avail-
ability of federal funds to assist states in the costs of operating their systems for adminis-
tering justice-i.e., it might restrict eligibility for such assistance to states that provide for 
twelve-person juries. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (upholding the 
Equal Access Act, which prohibits public secondary schools receiving federal financial 
assistance from denying student organizations equal access to school facilities on the basis 
of the content, including religious content, of their speech). We do not pause to examine 
that possible use of the spending power "with strings attached." No such law or proposal 
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to mandate. 
The provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA)27 stand on exactly the same empty ground and are utter-
ly indistinguishable. They are no different from the two examples 
we have now examined, or endless others we might just as easily 
propose. Perhaps it will be useful to provide just one more illus-
tration, nonetheless, simply to make the point very clear. 
c. 
We turn, then, to a third example. Imagine a Congress, a 
"liberal" Congress-one much more tolerant of, or even supportive 
of, sexually explicit speech (including "obscenity") than the First 
Amendment requires it to be.28 If it wishes to embrace such a 
more tolerant policy, Congress may surely do so-it may assuredly 
relax or repeal such federal statutes (such as those governing the 
U.S. Post Office) as may currently restrict obscenity.29 Yet, al-
though one readily concedes that this is so, nothing gives Congress 
any similar prerogative with respect to state and local laws-laws 
that are not of its creation and thus not similarly subject to its 
legislative preferences. It has no power, for example, to set aside a 
carefully and narrowly drawn anti-obscenity ordinance in Los An-
geles, which ordinance meets every test the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly declared to be sufficient under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.3o Least of all could Congress presume to do so on 
the strength of any power confided to it by Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment (for example, by providing that no state law or 
is before us, nor is the RFRA such a law. 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). See Appendix for the full text of the statute. 
28. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("We hold that obscenity is 
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech .... "). 
29. Note that in so doing, however, Congress would not be exercising a power to 
"enforce" the First Amendment. No such power is given to Congress; the First Amend-
ment is not an empowering clause; it is a disabling clause (i.e., it disables Congress). Nor 
does the Necessary and Proper Clause apply, for that clause merely equips Congress to 
enact legislation suitable, in its view, to "carry into execution" such "powers" as are 
otherwise vested in it-and the First Amendment vests none in it (or in anyone else). 
For insightful discussions of this point, see Bybee, supra note 20, at 1555-57, and William 
T. Mayton, "Buying-Up Speech": Active Government and the Terms of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments, 3 WM. & MARy BILL OF RIGHTS J. 373, 386-405 (1994). Rather, in 
the example just provided, Congress would merely be exercising its discretion under the 
Post Office Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
30. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-34 (1973) (discussing the First and Four-
teenth Amendment constraints on state and local anti-obscenity laws). 
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local ordinance presuming to regulate or restrict obscene material 
shall be deemed to be valid in any court). 
To be sure, Congress need not be impressed with the Court's 
interpretations of the First Amendment,31 and so need not "con-
form" to them in its own legislation-it may permit freer circula-
tion of obscene materials, as far as its own statutes are concerned, 
than the Supreme Court says it must alloW.32 But it can scarcely 
claim to be "enforcing" any provision in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment when it seeks to insulate local purveyors of obscene material 
from answering to constitutionally valid and unexceptional state and 
local laws fully sustained in the Supreme Court. Insofar as those 
state and local laws are consistent with the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, the states owe no one an apology for enacting and 
fairly enforcing them. Nor is there any authority in Congress to 
forbid the states to do so, under pretense of "enforcing" the Four-
teenth Amendment itself.33 
31. For example, it may feel that the Court's interpretations are "too narrow," or 
"too rigid," or "insufficiently appreciative of the value of free speech." 
32. For a useful review of such matters, see Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional 
Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REv. 57, 61-68 
(1986). 
33. To override state laws forbidding the sale or possession of obscene materials the 
Court holds unprotected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, Congress would need 
to rely on some other power than that vested by Section 5. For example, it might rely 
on the power to "regulate commerce . . . among the several states," as vested in Con-
gress in Article I, pursuant to which it may protect trade in such publications it prefers 
to be freely circulated in the United States without interference by state laws. The 
RFRA makes no claim under the Commerce Clause, nor, given its reach-it presumes to 
reach literally every state law or practice-could it do so with any hope of being sus-
tained. Cf, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (holding that the Com-
merce Clause, although broad, is not so expansive to convert CongreSSional authority to 
a general pOlice power of the sort retained by the states). 
For a twice-useful comparison in this very regard, compare the Privacy Protection 
Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-6(f) (1994), with the RFRA. Just like the RFRA, the 
Privacy Protection Act was a congressional response to a Supreme Court decision, 
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). See S. REp. No. 96-874, at 4 (1980), 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950. It effectively displaces the decision, requiring the 
use of less intrusive subpoenas (rather than more physically intrusive search warrants) by 
police when material is sought of newspapers or other publishers, subject to certain ex-
ceptions (e.g., when "there is reason to believe ... immediate seizure ... is necessary 
to prevent ... destruction" of the material). 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(b)(1)-(3). In contrast 
with the RFRA, however, the Privacy Protection Act is expressly tied to the Commerce 
Clause-specifically, it is solely applicable to work in preparation for newspapers, book 
publiShers, and broadcast companies "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce." Id. 
§ 2000aa(a), (b) (emphasis added). The RFRA makes no such pretense, of course, and 
also has no such limiting provision; again, it applies to every state law, whatever its sub-
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D. 
The same is equally true when we turn, finally, to the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration ACt.34 A state, the Supreme Court has 
said (in Employment Division v. Smith), may excuse those who 
ingest various drugs incidental to some religious practice,35 but it 
is without constitutional obligation to make such an exception.36 
This is equally true of Congress. Nothing in the First or Four-
teenth Amendments compels the state (or Congress) to grant such 
an exception. In this respect, moreover, a state's neutral treatment 
of criminal drug use stands on the same permissible constitutional 
footing as its resolve to disallow obscene materials to be freely 
bought and sold,37 its use of six-person (rather than twelve-per-
son) juries,38 or its policy to permit police searches of open fields. 
Whether a neighboring state, or the federal government, has a dif-
ferent policy on one or more of these matters-as each assuredly 
maf9-is for each to settle in respect to laws under its own re~ 
ject, whether or not connected to some kind of commerce. Whether the Privacy Protec-
tion Act is constitutional may depend on one's view of United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 
1624 (1995), but nothing more. It makes no claim of a supererogatory power in Congress 
of the sort asserted in the RFRA. 
34. The Appendix to this Essay contains the full text of the RFRA. 
35. The state may make such exception, that is, despite the Establishment Clause. 
And, in fact, immediately subsequent to the Court's decision in Smith, the Oregon legis-
lature reconsidered and enacted just such an exception. See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
475.992(5) (Supp. 1996) (providing an affirmative defense for possession of peyote "used 
or ... intended for use . . . [i]n connection with the good faith practice of a religious 
belief"). 
36. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
37. It is just as clear that under Smith a state need not exempt religious vendors of 
criminally obscene materials from its criminal obscenity laws. (Though it may, if somehow 
so inclined.) See id. 
38. Nor, under Smith, would the state need to empanel a jury of more than six 
merely to "accommodate" a defendant who adheres, in good faith, to a religion forbid-
ding him, under pain of everlasting damnation, to be tried by a jury of fewer than 
twelve jurors. By way of contrast, under the RFRA this evidently would-or certainly 
might-be required of the state (since it would be easy enough, on such occasions, to 
empanel a jury of twelve and avoid a "substantial burden" on the accused). Our position 
here is the same as elsewhere, namely: if Congress, in its peculiar wisdom, wishes to 
provide for highly "religion-specific accommodations" in federal trials, perhaps it may do 
so as a matter of policy (despite what should strike many as an inappropriate form of 
religion-favoring inconsistent with the Establishment Clause). But, however that may be, 
Congress has no equivalent authority to impose such a policy on any state-not pursuant 
to anything in Article I, nor anything in Article nI, nor anything in Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment itself. . 
39. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
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spective authority, on such policy terms as it deems best for it-
self.40 They have command of their own policies, nothing more.41 
Congress, of course, does nothing wrong when it merely en-
acts legislation which it believes, in good faith, to be appropriate 
to enforce the constitutional obligations of each state as set out in 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Frequently Congress may 
have no choice other than to move ahead with legislation-matters 
may seem to call for positive measures of enforcement in a time 
or in a setting where there remains genuine uncertainty concerning 
the scope of the obligations imposed by Section 1. No one con-
tends that Congress must somehow "wait" for the Supreme Court's 
determination of the issue. Nevertheless, whenever Congress so 
conducts itself, it is necessarily for the Court eventually to say, 
once that Congressional assertion respecting each state's obligation 
has been challenged (as eventually it may be), whether Congress 
has got the matter right, or got it quite wrong.42 And here, unless 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."). 
40. Indeed, a state may well have provisions in its own constitution that are substan-
tially more restrictive of state action than anything compelled by Congress or by the U.S. 
Constitution. Compare, e.g., State v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1337-38 (N.Y. 1992) (finding 
that Article I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution protects private lands, clearly 
fenced and posted against trespassers, from searches), with Oliver v. United States, 466 
U.S. 170, 184 (1984) (finding that neither the Fourth nor Fourteenth Amendment man-
dates this treatment by New York). See also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 
(1988) ("Individual States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more 
stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution."); William W. 
Van Alstyne, "Thirty Pieces of Silver" For the Rights of Your People: Irresistible Offers 
Reconsidered as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 303, 
304-05 (1993) (citing cases and state constitutional provisions securing other rights). 
41. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992), which states that "the 
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require 
the States to govern according to Congress' instructions." Nothing in the Fourteenth 
Amendment takes any exception to this dictum. Section 5 empowers Congress to secure 
scrupulous compliance with the limitations on the states imposed by Section 1, including 
preventive and remedial legislation, but nothing more (i.e., it does not empower Congress 
to require the States to govern according to Congress' direction, as the RFRA com-
mands). 
42. It is as much the case here, as it was in Marbury v. Madison, that: "The powers 
of the legislature are defined and limited . . . . To what purpose are powers limited, and 
to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, 
be passed by those intended to be restrained?" 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803), ap-
plied in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118, 124-31 (1970) (striking federal statute that 
viewed as a violation of equal protection state laws not permitting 18-year-olds to vote in 
state elections); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (invalidating act of Congress 
that presumed to reach acts through Section 5 that the Court held not reached by Sec-
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the Court is itself willing already to concede error in its own deci-
sion in Employment Division v. Smith,43 it must hold that Con-
gress has gotten the matter quite wrong in fact. 
Indeed, unless the Court is prepared to abandon Smith, the 
case is not even close. The Court has declared that the Fourteenth 
Amendment steers a fine course between the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses-that is, it permits, but does not require, a 
state to provide religion-favoring exemptions from the burden of 
compliance with its general laws. Nevertheless, Congress insists 
quite plainly that a state must do so. Here we do not have a situa-
tion where Congress is excused by any original uncertainty. Con-
gress did not lack for any guiding decision from the Court. Rather, 
it knew the Court's decision. It simply did not like that decision, 
and, not liking it, moved quite literally to substitute as "law" the 
view of the dissent in the case. Even those justices who dissented 
in Smith should be reluctant to accept this view of congressional 
power under Section 5-power to approve what a dissent may say 
(as to the proper reach of the Fourteenth Amendment) and, by 
congressional fiat, in the mere verbal cellophane of Section 5, 
elevate it by congressional anointment as the law of the land. 
tion 1). For recent decisions of the Supreme Court confirming its continuing commitment 
to take constitutional federalism seriously whenever suitably raised, see Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1119 (1996) (holding that "notwithstanding Congress' clear intent 
to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, the Indian COmmerce Clause does not grant 
Congress that power"), United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (holding that 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress' authority to regulate inter-
state commerce), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding that 
"while COngress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the States to 
provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders, the Con-
stitution does not confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel the States to do 
so"). 
43. 494 U.S. fr72 (1990). The possibility is a substantial one. The decision was five-to-
four, and Justice Souter has since disclaimed any willingness to invest Smith with any 
courtesy of stare decisis, see Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
559 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring). Ironically, however, the effrontery of the RFRA 
should make the prospect of such an overruling less, rather than more, likely. For the 
COurt to overrule Smith in these circumstances would itself suggest a form of judicial 
truckling to COngress wholly unworthy of the Court. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992) (declining the government's invitation to overrule Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), out of concern for "principles of institutional integrity and 
the rule of stare decisis"). 
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II. 
A. 
307 
The flaw in the RPRA is not so simple as "Congress has 
instructed the Supreme Court how to interpret the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment.,,44 Congress has not done this; 
the Act's defenders are quite correct on this point,45 and the Act 
cannot be faulted on this particular ground.46 This is so, however, 
44. Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1566 (8th Cir.) (McMillian, J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 117 S. Ct. 193 (1996); see also In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407, 1421 n.1 (8th Cir. 
1996) (Bogue, J., dissenting) ("Having reviewed and studied [Judge McMillian's] thorough 
opinion in Hamilton, I am inclined to agree with his position."), petition for cert. filed, 65 
U.S.L.W. 3205 (U.S. Sept 19, 1996) (No. 96-437); State v. Miller, 538 N.W.2d 573, 579 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (Sundby, J., dissenting) ("I do not accept that Congress may com-
pel the United States Supreme Court to interpret the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment as Congress believes it should be interpreted."), affd, 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 
1996); cf. Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free 
Exercise Clause, 57 Omo ST. LJ. 65, 121 (1996) ("[The] RFRA is a congressional arrow 
aimed directly at the heart of the independent judicial function of constitutional interpre-
tation."); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437, 469, 473 (1994) ("Common 
sense suggests that [the] RFRA is a congressional effort to overrule the Supreme Court 
on a point of constitutional interpretation. . • . That is what RFRA's supporters wanted, 
and that is what they got. "). 
45. See, e.g., Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings: A Defense of 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 589, 612-26 (1996) (and see 
the sources cited therein). 
46. The problem with the RFRA is also not that it somehow unconstitutionally em-
powers the courts "to pass on religious questions," an objection raised recently by Justice 
Mosk of the California Supreme Court. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 
913 P.2d 909, 931 (Cal. 1996) (Mosk, J., concurring) (claiming that Congress, by uncon-
stitutionally requiring the judiciary to address religious questions through RFRA, has 
violated separation of powers), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3034 (U.S. July 8, 
1996) (No. 96-31) [unrelated to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith]; see also In re Tessier, 190 B.R. 396, 406-07 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995) (alleging 
unconstitutionality of the RFRA on grounds that it incorporates a standard for deciding 
religious questions that the Court had previously rejected and usurps the judiciary's au-
thority to determine the propriety of its jurisdiction); Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Su-
preme Court at Its Word: The Implications of RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. 
L. REv. 5, 6 (1995) (arguing that because the Supreme Court has refused to balance 
religious liberties against neutral government regulations, Congress cannot override that 
decision through ordinary legislation); Scott C. Idleman, The ReligiOUS Freedom Resto-
ration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEx. L. REv. 247, 273 (1994) 
(arguing that after Smith, the RFRA's requirement that the courts inquire into the sub-
stantiality of a burden on free exercise may be, in fact, unconstitutional). A variation of 
the argument appears in Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 44, at 445-52 (questioning the 
ability of courts to work with consistency or predictability within the entanglements of 
the Sherbert-Yoder test Congress requires them to use). 
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simply because Congress has not presumed to instruct any court 
directly on how to interpret, or judicially apply, anything in the 
Constitution. In the RFRA, Congress has not obtusely declared 
that: 
In every case arising under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment, the court shall construe that amendment to forbid 
any law substantially burdening a religious belief or religiously 
motivated act or practice, unless ... [etc.].47 
There are such cases, to be sure. That is, there are cases where resolution of the 
legal dispute would plunge a court into matters more appropriately deemed internal ec-
clesiastical disputes-matters with respect to which the Court has declared secular authori-
ty may not presume to take sides. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 
455, 466-67 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also WILLIAM W. VAN ALsTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT 
CASES AND MATERIALS 1126-56 (2d ed. 1995) (presenting cases and discussion on the 
issue of government neutrality). But the RFRA would not create such a situation. And 
Smith was not decided on the basis that requiring a court to decide whether a state law 
impinges in some "substantial way" on a person's "religious" practices or beliefs would 
per se unconstitutionally entangle that court in deciding essentially religious questions. It 
does not. As the Court itself has often enough observed, it is perfectly possible for there 
to be a "religion of one"-that is, an individual's wholly personal "religion" which is 
nevertheless one's religion, though no ordinary church or religion would recognize it. See, 
e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1994); see also United States v. Seeger, 
380 U.S. 163, 185-88 (1965). Accordingly, requiring that a claimant show in what way his 
religiously impelled practices-whatever they may be-would be substantially (rather than 
insubstantially) burdened by the law in question simply does not per se entangle courts in 
unravelling strands of religious doctrine, or in taking sides in ecclesiastical disputes. 
While understandable, Justice Mosk's view is nonetheless incorrect and involves a 
misreading of the Supreme Court's decision in Smith. Indeed, Mosk's concern cannot be 
accurate, since the Smith decision itself permits legislatures to exempt religious persons 
from complying with laws of general application-notwithstanding the Establishment 
Clause-and holds merely that nothing in the Free Exercise Clause compels legislatures 
to do so. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-80, 890. Obviously, however, if a legislature were to 
do so, any person claiming the benefit of the statutory exemption would have to demon-
strate his eligibility. In other words, the Smith decision itself contemplates and permits 
legislation that would draw the courts into the detennination of the bona fides of individ-
ual religious claims. 
47. That the RFRA does not operate in this fashion is illustrated by Smith v. Fair 
Employment & Housing Commission, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 
U.S.L.W. 3034 (U.S. July 8, 1996) (No. 96-31). In that case, a religiously anguished land-
lord sought relief from a state anti-discrimination statute exposing her to damages for 
refusing to rent to unmarried cohabiting couples. (To do so, according to her good faith 
religious beliefs, would impermissibly implicate her in committing a sin-that is, facilitat-
ing their immoral living arrangement.) She presented two distinct federal claims, using 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 as the vehicle for both. The first claim was that the statute as applied to 
her was invalid under the First Amendment, as applied through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Applying solely the Supreme Court's First Amendment standards as provided in 
Smith by Justice Scalia (writing for the Court), the state supreme court rejected her 
claim. See id. at 918-21. The issue was deemed easy. The impugned state law was neu-
tral on its face and was of general application, and there was no suggestion that it had 
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The RFRA is, rather, closer in its design to the statute at 
issue in United States v. Klein.48 In that 1870 statute, Congress in-
structed the Court as to the legal effect ~f a presidential par-
don.49 The statute thus breached separation of powers both with 
respect to the president's pardon power (i.e., nullifying it) and 
with respect to the judicial power (i.e., dictating the legal effect of 
a presidential pardon). With the RFRA, the directive is to dictate 
the legal effect courts are to give to any party's free exercise 
c1aim-directing the court to give it the legal effect appropriate in 
Congress' view (as stipulated in the statute), contrary to the judi-
cial understanding of the Free Exercise Clause.5o The RFRA 
been adopted out of any religious animus. Nor was there any additional constitutional 
claim entwined with her religious claim. Thus all the criteria of Smith were readily met. 
That having been decided, the court then separately examined her claim based on the 
different (and more stringent) provisions of the RFRA, pursuant to which it narrowly 
concluded that the act was valid as applied. See ill. at 921-29. 
For another example, see Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 193 (1996). Here, a Native American st!lte prisoner challenged a prison regula-
tion restricting hair length and the prison's lack of a suitable sweat lodge. Using 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, the prisoner alleged a claim under the First Amendment Free Exercise 
Clause and a claim under the RFRA. Although the majority denied both claims, the 
dissent made it plain that-were he to find the RFRA constitutional-he would permit 
the RFRA challenge (but not the Free Exercise challenge) of the hair regulation to 
proceed. Id. at 1557 (McMillian, J., dissenting). 
Each of these cases is highly instructive in a different way, however, for each also 
indicates very well the intended effect of the RFRA. What is that "intended effect"? It is 
that while the RFRA does not affect how a court adjudicates the First Amendment 
claim, it takes steps to ensure that any such adjudication will no longer matter. Nothing 
need turn on it-the very purpose of the Act is to ensure that this will be so, to 
marginalize any such determination by the court, and to do so, moreover, to the point of 
making it a virtual irrelevancy (in effect, to reduce it to mere trash). Each of the cases 
just noted illustrates the point perfectly well, as do the cases cited infra at note 51. 
48. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
49. Briefly, the problem was this. Congress had provided for the recovery of private 
property captured by the United States during the Civil War, provided the claimant 
proved that "he [had] never given any aid or comfort to the . . . rebellion." Act of 
March 12, 1863, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 820, 820. The Supreme Court had then affirmed 
judgments against the United States for such property, based in part on presidential par-
dons. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 182-83 (citing as an example United States v. 
Padleford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870». Subsequently, in 1870, Congress dictated that 
"any pardon • . . granted by the President . . . shall be taken and deemed . . . conclu-
sive evidence that such person did take part in and give aid and comfort to the . . . 
rebellion." Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235. This latter statute came be-
fore the Supreme Court in Klein. 
50. Judge Smalkin caught the distinction, as well as the connection, between the 
RFRA and the statute at issue in Klein in his recent opinion, Keeler v. Mayor of 
Cumberland, 928 F. Supp. 591, 604 (D. Md. 1996) (holding the RFRA beyond the power 
vested in Congress by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). Judge Smalkin stated: 
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['The] RFRA itself forthrightly declares that its purpose is to restore the com-
pelling interest test as the rule of decision in cases implicating the First Amend-
ment. . .. ['The] RFRA violates the constitutional separation of powers by 
requiring the courts to employ a standard of judicial review for First Amend-
ment cases which has been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court. • • . This 
[court] is aware of no other statute by which Congress resurrected a judicially-
rejected standard of judicial review for an entire class of constitutional cases. 
Id. at 598-604. By the substantive terms of the RFRA, in Judge Smalkin's view, courts 
are thus instructed to disregard the Court's view of the First Amendment and to apply 
Congress' view instead (i.e., the view it enacted in the RFRA). And, in this sense, the 
observations of Gressman, Carmella, Eisgruber, and Sager, see supra note 44, are also 
quite right. Paul Brest presciently anticipated just this kind of act a full decade ago. See 
Brest, supra note 32, at 76 ("What are the possible consequences if Congress does at-
tempt to contradict judicial doctrine? First, the Court might simply defer to Congress' 
interpretation; this would, of course, require overruling or at least significantly modifying 
Marbury.") (footnote omitted). 
By his reference to an "entire class of constitutional cases," see Keeler, 928 F. 
Supp. at 604, Judge Smalkin also distinguished, quite appropriately, the reach of the rea-
soning in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). The reasoning (such as it is) sus-
taining the Morgan statute is readily distinguishable. Judge Smalkin's observation was that 
in cases of the Morgan genus, Congress relied on a "specially informed legislative compe-
tence"-not competence with respect to the "proper meaning" of the constitutional provi-
sion in question, but rather a "special competence" (such as it may be) to examine spe-
cific problematic areas. Keeler, 928 F. Supp. at 602-03 (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 656). 
According to this paradigm, Congress would (a) take a hard look into a particular subject 
(e.g., literacy tests, race, and voting rights); (b) take a measure of the area as it deems 
warranted (e.g., review where such tests are given, how they tend to be applied, the 
extent to which they may lend themselves to improper application, the extent to which 
that has in fact occurred, etc.); (c) measure the adequacy of current means to address the 
problem(s); and, when Congress deems it appropriate to do so, (d) propose by statute a 
suitable additional measure convincing to Congress as a necessary and proper one-a 
statute to be respected insofar as courts can see a "reasonable basis" for it, given 
Congress' findings, such as they are. Legitimate Morgan cases, such as they are, are of 
this retail kind. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1980); 
Fullilove v. K1utznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-78 (1980). Even the statute at issue in Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), retained more (though not enough) of this character than 
anything akin to the RFRA. See Brest, supra note 32, at 72-78. 
To model another act of Congress so as to more nearly resemble the RFRA, in 
the very sense that Judge Smalkin had in mind (in correctly concluding that the RFRA 
dictates the substance of judicial review in all cases colorably asserting a Free Exercise 
claim), one would need an act declaring nothing in reference to any specific "problem-
area" of equal protection cases. It would be an act simply declaring a very strong view 
of what the Equal Protection Clause forbids-for example, an act providing that: "No act 
or action of any kind by any state or local government substantially more burdensome to 
some persons within the jurisdiction of the state than to other persons within the same 
state, shall be adopted or applied by any state." The statute, if it were truly akin to the 
RFRA in both purpose and effect, would further declare that: "It is the express purpose 
of this act to make it of no legal consequence (and thus no defense to the state) that 
nothing the state has done or failed to do is inconsistent with any provision in the Four-
teenth Amendment merely according to the Supreme Court." 
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means (and declares that it means) to make the alleged "right" of 
the complaining party carry more by way of entitlement than the 
Court has declared the Constitution provides. It does not put too 
fine a point on the matter to say that the RFRA is meant to 
make the lack of a meritorious First Amendment claim (an 
"unmeritorious" claim, in the Supreme Court's view) utterly irrele-
vant.51 
The RFRA thus presupposes that the courts will reject the 
First Amendment claim or defense as "without merit" so long as 
Smith remains intact.52 (Indeed, it is only in such a circumstance 
that the RFRA has any work of its own.) Yet for all that (and 
herein is the anomaly), it purports still to be an act providing for 
the mere "enforcement" of the First Amendmenii3-even while 
seeking to make the Court's view of the First Amendment irrele-
vant insofar as the Court's view (of what the amendment does and 
Moreover, contrary to Judge Posner's suggestion in Sasnett v. Sullivan, it is plainly 
not the design of the RFRA merely "to make the formal right of religious freedom of 
persons who lack political power in individual states ... a meaningful right" 91 F.3d 
1018, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 1996). Rather, it is (as Judge Posner conceded elsewhere in the 
same opinion, see id. at 1020-21) the express design of the RFRA-a design it presumes 
exactly to fulfill-to assert that Congress' view, not the Supreme Court's view, of what 
varieties of state laws shall not be deemed consistent with the First Amendment shall 
control-indeed that religious exemption entitlements shall generally be furnished in every 
state, across the board, under every law, absent some sufficient excuse the state must be 
prepared to prove by the standards Congress presumed to reenact in the RFRA. 
51. Which is precisely what the Act does. See, e.g., cases and discussion supra notes 
47 and 50; see also Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 475 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding likelihood 
of success on the merits in Rastafarian inmate's RFRA challenge to ''medical keeplock" 
(confinement) for failure to submit to tuberculosis test; the court did not evaluate his 
First Amendment free exercise claim, but did note its lesser standard); Hicks v. Gamer, 
69 F.3d 22, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1995) (permitting Rastafarian inmate to proceed with RFRA, 
but not First Amendment free exercise, challenge to prison hair length and beard regula-
tions). 
52. In this respect, moreover, it is very much like the statute involved in Klein. See 
supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text In that instance, too, Congress presupposed 
that without its instruction respecting the judicial use to be made of the pardon Klein 
relied upon, the Court was likely to treat that pardon exactly in the manner Klein pro-
posed. Congress sought to "veto" that presumed treatment, by its directive to the Court. 
See id. 
53. Or, rather, the "enforcement" of the Fourteenth Amendment-specifically, the 
"liberty due process" feature that is deemed to apply the First Amendment Free Exercise 
Clause co-equally to the states. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 
(1940). The RFRA's theory is that Congress can make water run uphill, by finding 
"rights" in the Fourteenth Amendment (namely, special entitlements to exemptions from 
laws of general application) notwithstanding the Supreme Court's view that no rights of 
this exceptional sort are encompassed by the First Amendment 
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does not prohibit) may be inconsistent with its own.54 In turn, 
that the RFRA "just happens" to select the standards it directs all 
courts to apply from previous (but now discarded) views of the 
Supreme Court (views the Court once thought, but no longer 
thinks, appropriate as a matter of First Amendment law)-rather 
than from some other source-is made irrelevant under the Act. 
The Act enacts what it enacts. But it is not irrelevant under the 
Constitution insofar as the question under the Constitution is where 
Congress got the authority to substitute these standards, such that 
they now become "the supreme law of the land." 
We know what Congress claims. On the face of the RFRA 
itself, Congress claims a power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to pick and choose among various Supreme Court 
justices and from various past opinions respecting the extent to 
which states are or are not limited by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. And it claims that Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment empowers it to elevate a dissent's view into supreme 
law, by statute, when Congress adds its votes to those of the dis-
54. See supra notes 19, 47, 50, and 51 and accompanying text. It is just this uniquely 
sweeping and aggressive feature of the Act that has, quite understandably, led observers 
such as Brest, Eisgruber, Sager, Gressman, and Carmella, see supra notes 32 and 44, to 
see it as an attack on Marbury v. Madison-that is, insofar as it claims a power in Con-
gress to set aside constitutional interpretations by the courts when such interpretations 
are not acceptable to Congress. And in that sense, they are quite right. See RFRA 
§ 2000bb(b)(1) (reporting that the purpose of the Act is to make the view of the Su-
preme Court respecting what the First Amendment does and does not do as, hereafter, 
to count for nothing insofar as it differs from Congress' view). That this is the intended 
effect is quite clear. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 19, at 219 (quite unembarrass-
edly describing the RFRA as meant to be "a replacement for the Free Exercise Clause" 
and, as a replacement, "as universal as the Free Exercise Clause") (emphasis added). An 
act that is a "replacement" for a provision in the Constitution (and "as universal" as the 
provision it "replaces"), however, can hardly be described in the same breath as merely 
an "enforcement" of the very thing it replaces, or so one may quite properly-perhaps 
even tartIy-suggest. And there can be no doubt that the Act was intended as that re-
placement. 
The Act thus does not stand merely on a claim that it is simply an appropriate 
measure to prevent otherwise-difficult-to-prove violations of the First or Fourteenth 
Amendment. Cf. Laycock, supra note 19, at 146; Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1019 
(7th Cir. 1996); Flores v. City of Boerne, Tex., 73 F.3d 1352, 1361 (5th Cir.), cert. grant-
ed, 117 S. Ct. 293 (Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 95-2074). It stands, rather, on a blunt claim of 
authority in Congress to legislate an interpretation of the First (and Fourteenth) 
Amendment, an interpretation that Congress prefers to the Supreme Court's, and authori-
ty to require that interpretation to be applied in all courts and with respect to all free 
exercise cases. 
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senting justices55 and thus empowers it to determine how the 
states are to be governed.56 
But if, indeed, Congress has this special power, there is little 
reason to think that it must find the standards it enacts in even 
some past (discarded) or some current (dissenting) opinion of the 
Supreme Court, rather than, say, finding them in some well-written 
article by Douglas Laycock,57 or in a column by George Will or 
55. Compare the following version of the RFRA: 
In any case where the free exercise claim would fail under the First Amend-
ment according to the majority in Smith, but not fail under the First Amend-
ment according to the dissent in Smith, the court shall-according to our in-
struction-decide the case before it in the manner directed by the dissent in 
Smith, namely, in the following manner [etc.]. 
In what way, if any, does this differ from the RFRA? Not at all. Indeed, Congress did 
enact this statute, merely rephrased-this is the RFRA. 
56. Although, note, not how Congress itself is to be governed. For the RFRA pro-
vides an exemption from its own provisions for any act of Congress that expressly ex-
empts itself (§ 2000bb-3(b) of the Act so provides), no such privilege, however, being 
available by the terms of the Act to any state. This feature of the RFRA is merely 
further indicative of its anomalous and spudous claims. On the one hand, the statute 
purports to do no more than "enforce" a clause (the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment) made merely as binding on the states by force of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as it is already on Congress. On the other hand, the statute expressly pro-
vides that Congress may pass legislation and provide that the legislation applies uniformly 
and unexceptionally to all persons (i.e., may exempt itself from the strictures of the 
RFRA)-such that no court may deem the legislation inapplicable merely because it 
happens to burden certain religious practices, whether or not it serves any compelling 
interest. At the same time, of course, Congress makes no claim at all that it can thereby 
also exempt itself from the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted, understood, and applied 
by the Supreme Court. 
So, for example, Congress may enact any drug control laws it thinks suitable 
(merely pursuant to the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause), declare 
the RFRA inapplicable for such reasons as are satisfactory to itself, and count on courts 
never to subject the law to the standards of the RFRA (which are not, therefore, First 
Amendment standards after all)-with complete and correct confidence that the law will 
not be deemed to offend the First Amendment so long as it meets the standards of 
Smith and so long as Smith itself commands a majority in the Supreme Court. But Con-
gress presumes to maintain that no state law, however neutral (i.e., no matter how simi-
lar to its own) could be equally valid, no matter how well it likewise complies with 
Smith. For, again, so far as the states are concerned, Congress has declared that the 
Court's view of the First Amendment is not controlling; rather, its own view, "re-enact-
ing" the Sherbert-Yoder test, shall be the First Amendment governing the states-albeit 
not equally governing itself to the extent it chooses not to be so governed. The coy 
provisions of the RFRA-with its express, carefully built-in, self-exemption clause-merely 
further expose the straw of its own construction. It is as if Section 5 empowered Con-
gress to enforce a version of the First Amendment to which the states must do homage, 
though Congress itself need pay no similar homage except just so far as it feels inclined. 
57. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. cr. REv. 1; see 
also Brant, supra note 46, at 7. Brant states: 
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Art Buchwald.58 The source of Congress' inspiration is really of 
little moment, for nothing turns on it: the challenge, in the sense 
of which Justice Jackson wrote in Brown v. Allen,59 is the same. 
Was Congress, in a word, ever put in charge of "overruling" the 
Supreme Court, and given power to "reverse,,60 the Court's deci-
sions, expediently legislating a dissenting opinion into "law" there-
after to govern, until such time as Congress might experience 
some change of mind?61 It seems seriously doubtful that this can 
be SO.62 Rather, a more nearly accurate description respecting 
Congress' enforcement authority in respect to the prohibitory 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment is very likely this: 
When recognized state violations of federal constitutional stan-
dards have occurred, Congress is of course empowered by § 5 to 
take appropriate remedial measures to redress and prevent the 
wrongs. But it is a judicial question whether the condition with 
which Congress has thus sought to deal is in truth an in-
fringement of the Constitution, something that is the necessary 
prerequisite to bringing the § 5 power into play at all.63 
The new House Bill 2797 [which eventually became the RFRA] contained a 
section entitled "Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purposes," consisting 
of five findings of fact and two definitive statements of purpose [retained in 
final version of the RFRAJ. No basis for these factual findings appears in the 
legislative record. Rather, they appear to be drawn from the remarks of one 
senator and an academic witness [Laycock] who submitted several letters and 
testified in support of the Act. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
58. Indeed, Congress might just as readily have gotten its standards from something 
that Art Buchwald, George Will, or William Safire sparked off, in a merely complaining 
or humorous (or merely mischievous) column on "What Ought to Be Given to Religious 
People (Though Not Equally to Anyone Else) By Way of Exemption from Otherwise 
Valid Laws." In a straightforward understanding of its provisions, of course, this is not 
merely what the RFRA means to do; rather, Congress meant to dictate what the Four-
teenth Amendment shall be deemed to require and what all states must therefore 
do-whether otherwise inclined or not, and though the Supreme Court has declared this 
is not required by any provision in the Constitution. 
59. See supra text accompanying note 2 ("if there were a super-Supreme 
Court .... ") (emphasis added). 
60. See supra text accompanying note 3 (President Clinton'S statement at the signing 
of the RFRA) (n[T)his act reverses the Supreme Court's decision ... ."). 
61. That is, until a later Congress decides that perhaps the majority in Smith actually 
got the matter right, after all, and so "enacts" that view into law instead. (Congress' 
view of its authority pursuant to Section 5 implicitly claims authority to "overrule" itself, 
of course, as well as to "overrule" the Supreme Court.) 
62. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
63. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 666 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). Justice Rehnquist made a similar point in his dissent in City of Rome v. United 
States: 
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B. 
The polar opposite position, on this quintessential separation-
of-powers question, is laid bare in the view offered by Professor 
William Cohen. It is that whatever the state would be free to do 
to relax its law, Congress can do "for it" instead. That is, Congress 
may impose such rules to limit the states as Congress thinks best, 
and go as far as the most permissive state could, as a simple do-
mestic policy choice.64 
The Cohen position, however, ultimately frankly detaches 
itself from any effective pretense of having any real connection at 
all with Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, it stands 
or falls on the utter abandonment of federalism review by the 
Supreme COurt.65 It is wholly of a commonplace piece with the 
Wechsler-Choper federalism thesis, effectively declaring that the 
courts should simply take the view that the Constitution leaves it 
to Congress to determine the extent to which the states retain any 
authority to legislate in any way Congress mayor may not wish 
them to, regardless of subject matter.66 The Cohen thesis also 
If the enforcement power is construed as a "remedial" grant of authority, it is 
this Court's duty to ensure that a challenged congressional Act does no more 
than "enforce" the limitations on state power established in the Fourteenth ... 
AmendmentO. Marbury v. Madison . 
. . . [I]n order to invoke a remedy, there must be a wrong-and under a reme-
dial construction of congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth ... Amend-
mentO, that wrong must amount to a constitutional violation. Only when the 
wrong is identified can the appropriateness of the remedy be measured. 
446 U.S. 156, 211, 213 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omit-
ted). 
64. See William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 614 (1975). Cohen writes: 
[A] congressional judgment resolving at the national level an issue that 
couid-without constitutional objection-be decided in the same way at the state 
level, ought normally to be binding on the courts, since Congress presumably 
reflects a balance between both national and state interests and hence is better 
able to adjust such conflicts. 
Id.; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 5-14, at 347-48 
(2d ed. 1988) (summarizing this position). 
65. Professor Cohen candidly conceded (in attempting to make some broad categori-
cal sense of Katzenbach v. Morgan as he tried, conscientiously, to do) that his position is 
also inconsistent with the Court's decision in Oregon v. Mitchell. See Cohen, supra note 
64, at 616-17 ("One difficulty with the liberty-federalism theory is that it will not distin-
guish ... Katzenbach v. Morgan and Oregon v. Mitchell.") 
66. The notion, in sum, is that the states were never to receive any judicial protec-
tion under the Constitution (i.e., protection through the courts)-that they were solely to 
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breaks with rationalizing the act of Congress as a mere "enforce-
ment" of some constitutional limitation imposed on the states. A 
simple example should make this plain. We return to the state ob-
scenity law once again. 
A state may criminalize obscenity, as we have previously 
noted, but of course it need not do so. Having once done so, 
moreover, it may later decide to repeal its anti-obscenity law. It 
may do so, to be sure, on account of a requirement in its own 
state constitution "free speech" clause-or it may do so from a 
belief that either the letter or spirit of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments would be more faithfully carried into effect by doing 
so. But let us suppose that it reaches neither of these conclusions; 
let us suppose instead that it repeals its anti-obscenity law from no 
more a sublime (nor less excellent) reason than it might have in 
similarly deciding to repeal some of its criminal drug laws, namely, 
the conclusion that these laws simply tend to do more harm than 
good, that they spawn a heavy criminalized traffic (in drugs, or in 
obscene materials), that they stimulate criminal activities in much 
the same way that Prohibition did, and that it is simply time to 
take a different approach altogether (even as many believe to be 
warranted in respect to criminalized drugs). 
In brief, from the state's view, the matter (as we are here 
stipulating it to be) is no different in constitutional terms than the 
state's decision to decriminalize commercial transactions in liquor 
and other alcoholic beverages. The state is perfectly aware that the 
Twenty-First Amendment permits it to be a "dry" state and, with 
that understanding, neither does it believe that there is any "fun-
damental right" of people to imbibe alcohol. Its decriminalization 
receive such "protection" as the "built-in structural provisions" of the Constitution might 
offer (namely, protection at the pleasure of Congress, whatever it might be). This is the 
Wechsler-Choper thesis writ large. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND TIm 
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-76 (1980); Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National 
Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1557 
(1977); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 
558-60 (1954); see also James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine 
of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129, 130-44 (1893) (reviewing the origins of the 
power of courts to invalidate legislative acts, and advocating a highly deferential review). 
Professor Cohen also relied on Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), to suggest 
that the thesis had been essentially accepted by the Supreme Court. See Cohen, supra 
note 64, at 613 n.49. Understandably, he failed to anticipate that the Court might not 
agree. It does not. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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of alcohol consumption, or of marijuana consumption, 
or-indeed-of obscenity consumpti9n, is not and need not be 
driven by anything so sublime as some notion of constitutional 
entitlements, or any special desire to extend "liberty" as such. 
Rather, . the state is driven by the practical conclusion that the 
current regime creates negative externalities that the state desires 
to avoid-which it then does, by taking a more relaxed, less regu-
latory, less draconian view. And all of this is perfectly sensible for 
the state to do. 
Under the Cohen thesis, however, insofar as there is no con-
stitutional barrier on the state's relaxation or outright abandon-
ment of any of these, laws (and surely there is none), Congress 
could itself evidently step in and could sweep all the same state 
laws aside-at least with (and maybe even without?) pretense of 
doing so as an exercise of authority under Section 5 to enforce the 
"Liberty" Clause of Section 1. For, under the Cohen view (as a 
mere implementation of the Thayer-extended-by-Wechsler-extend-
ed-by-Choper view67), the Supreme Court appropriately abrogates 
federalism review in favor of Congress.68 
Indeed, it is just this, too, that is also at stake, even as it was 
in earlier cases, as Justice Harlan, Alexander Bickel, and others 
have recognized all along.69 And it is also why the Court's own 
recent "federalism" decisions, New York v. United States,70 United 
States v. Lopez,71 and Seminole Tribe v. Florida,72 are significant 
as well. And so, too, as Bickel believed, are Marbury v. Madi-
son73 and McCulloch v. Ma1ylan~4 involved, respecting the role 
67. See supra note 66. 
68. But see supra note 20 and accompanying text (noting the express rejection of 
such a proposal). 
69. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 u.s. 641, 666 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (ex-
cerpted supra at text accompanying note 63); Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, supra note 
20, at 95-102; supra notes 20, 50, and 54. 
70. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
71. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
72. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). 
73. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
74. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819). In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall wrote: 
[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the 
accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the [national] government . . . it 
would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a 
decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land. 
ld.; see also 1 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARsHALL 452 (1919) (re-
marks of John Marshall during the Virginia ratification debates) ("If ... [Congress] were 
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of the Court in keeping Congress within the boundary of its enu-
merated powers-in this instance, the power to "enforce" the pro-
visions of the Fourteenth Amendment.7S 
C. 
In his influential treatise, Professor Tribe presents two other 
views76 and concludes strongly on a different view still: 
It is not difficult to reconcile congressional power to define the 
content of fourteenth amendment rights with Marbury v. Madison 
and judicial review. Iudicial review does not require that the 
Constitution always be equated with the Supreme Court's view of 
it. It is the Court's responsibility, under Marbury, to strike down 
acts of Congress which the Court concludes to be unconstitution-
al-nothing more.77 
Of course, this is all true-artfully couched as it is with the appro-
priate (but merely nominal) nod to judicial review in its conclud-
ing observation. But it also quite begs the question (or, rather, 
asserts a premise that proves too much and is false). It is the 
Court's responsibility to strike down acts of Congress for which 
Congress can provide no authority to have enacted its will; this 
much Professor Tribe concedes.7s The question comes around 
then, still again: pursuant to what authority was this act adopted? 
What "provision" in the Fourteenth Amendment does the RFRA 
"enforce"? It is given this power, not some other; there is no 
power given to Congress "to define" the content of the Fourteenth 
Amendment however it may like. 
Congress is given power to "define the content" of certain 
things, to be sure-for example, the power to determine the "con-
tent" of the rules by which it operates.79 Such provisions are 
to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered 
by the [National] judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard. 
They would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would de-
clare it void."}. 
75. See Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, supra note 20, at 97-98. 
76. See TRIBE, supra note 64, § 5-14, at 34~8 (outlining a total of four approaches 
to Justice Brennan's opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan). 
77. Id. § 5-14, at 349 (footnote omitted); see also Robin-Vergeer, supra note 45, at 
765 (citing the above passage from Tribe in her defense of the RFRA's constitutionality). 
78. See TRIBE, supra note 64, § 5-2, at 298-300. 
79. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings."). 
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twice instructive. They stand in contrast, not in parity, with the 
Fourteenth Amendment. They well indicate that Congress itself 
knows the difference. A mere rephrasing of Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, so to provide just such a power in Con-
gress-"to define the content of rights provided in Section l"-is 
enough to make clear how utterly different it would look. And it 
makes clear how utterly implausible it is to suppose that any pro-
vision as thus proposed would-in 1868 or now-be ratified by the 
requisite number of states.so 
In Marbury itself, note it could perfectly well be said that 
Congress was merely "enforcing" (if now translated as "defining 
the content of') a provision in Article ITI-namely, the provision 
that sketches the judicial power and then vests it in one Supreme 
Court and such inferior courts as Congress may provide.s1 In 
vesting the judicial power in the Supreme Court, Article ill goes 
on to vest it in that Court partly as a matter of original jurisdic-
tion (two kinds of cases are specified), and partly as a matter of 
appellate jurisdiction, then authorizing Congress to place within 
the court's original jurisdiction some additional cases it deems 
appropriate to so place, excepting them from its appellate jurisdic-
tion, where they would otherwise have remained. Or so at least 
one could readily read Article lIT; such a reading would not be, in 
any obvious way, "unreasonable.,,82 And if all that is required is 
that the Court be able to see "a reasonable basis" for the reading 
(i.e., the interpretation or the rendering) Congress provided,s3 
then in Marbury itself, the Court should have sustained the Judi-
ciary Act provision that did precisely this very thing (though in its 
own view that reading of Article ITI was incorrect). As we know, 
however, the Court inquired into the constitutional interpretation 
on which the Judiciary Act depended for its validity; it took 
80. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (noticing the rejection in Congress of a 
proposed draft of the Fourteenth Amendment that, even in its rejected terms, did not 
presume to confer this kind of power on Congress). 
81. See U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 1. 
82. Such a reading of Article III is eminently plaUSible, though not the only reading, 
to be sure. Any court could perceive "a reasonable basis" so to understand Article III in 
just this way. See William w. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 
1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 30-33. 
83. Compare Justice Brennan'S formulation for the majority in Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966) (stating that it is not for the Supreme Court to review 
§ 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 beyond determining "a basis upon which the 
Congress might resolve the conflict [between federal and state interests] as it did"). 
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Congress' view into account (always an appropriate matter to be 
sure); it disagreed with that interpretation (such as it was, as made 
by Congress); and it accordingly found that Congress had acted 
without authority (i.e., had acted in excess of any enumerated 
power) in providing as it had attempted to do. 
In a larger sense, of course, the view that the Court should 
accept any "constitutional interpretation" of a clause that serves as 
a necessary predicate for some act of Congress whenever the Court 
can see "a reasonable basis" for that interpretation by Congress 
would at once virtually put an end to most of what makes the 
Supreme Court of the United States important-indeed, put an 
end to most of the institution of judicial review itself. For unless 
one can see at least a reasonable basis for a claim that some act 
or action by a state is contrary to some provision in the Constitu-
tion, the claim is unlikely to advance very far in the first place, 
much less advance to the Supreme Court. 
To put the matter differently, it may correctly be said that we 
hardly need a Supreme Court just to rule on manifestly frivolous 
questions of constitutional law; rather, it is precisely in circum-
stances where "reasonable" people may (and do) differ that the 
unique resolving agency of the Supreme Court-to provide finality 
as well as stability-is most salient and most relevantly called upon 
to decide the matter.84 
84. The point was put perfectly well by Justice Jackson, a half century ago, in the 
excerpted quotation prefacing this Essay. It is appropriate to repeat it here: 
The generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment are so indeterminate as to what 
state actions are forbidden that this Court has found it a ready instrument, in 
one field or another, to magnify federal, and incidentally its ovm, authority over 
the states. . . . There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a 
substantial proportion of our [decisions respecting what the states mayor may 
not do consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment] would also be reversed. We 
are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we 
are final. 
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 534, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). Obviously, 
Congress' ambition here is to deny that proposition, to declare that the Court is not "fi-
nal" when it comes to saying what the states may not be permitted to do under the 
Fourteenth Amendment; rather, Congress is. And its ambition is to declare that if the 
Court will not read the "generalities" of the Fourteenth Amendment in a way satisfactory 
to ''magnify'' federal authority over the states, Congress will "reverse" the Court's deci-
sions and so, as a super-Supreme Court, presume suitably to magnify that authority for 
itself. 
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D. 
Then, too, there is Professor Robin-Vergeer's seductive re-
phrasing in her own conclusion (as an incident of which she quotes 
from Tribe), namely that: 
Under settled case law and the best understanding of its role on 
the constitutional stage, Congress has the power to enact legis-
lation augmenting fundamental constitutional values beyond the 
level of protection the Supreme Court would require as a matter 
of constitutional law and displacing conflicting state laws, regard-
less of whether the federal legislation seemingly "contradicts" the 
narrower Supreme Court precedent.85 
This, too, however, is essentially a mere figleaf of felicitous lan-
guage (about "augmenting constitutional values") to make the 
RFRA go down with a spoonful of rhetorical sugar. The dead 
giveaway is discoverable in Professor Robin-Vergeer's use of the 
word "seemingly" -as though the matter were not one of any real 
difference at all. But that is plainly false. There is nothing merely 
"seemingly" contradictory here. The suggestion that perhaps "Su-
preme Court precedent" and the provisions of the RFRA are only 
seemingly at odds, but actually fully reconcilable, is belied on the 
face of the Act and in the President's own description of both its 
purpose and its intended effect.86 
But, here, too, let us try it out in text; let us provisionally 
rewrite Section 5 straightforwardly, to say, for example: 
The Congress shall have power to enforce its view of this article 
by appropriate legislation. 
85. Robin-Vergeer, supra note 45, at 764 (emphasis added). 
86. See Appendix (reproducing full text of the RFRA); supra text accompanying note 
3 (President Clinton's statement that the RFRA "reverses" Employment Discrimination v. 
Smith); see also Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1361 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. grant-
ed, 117 S. Ct. 293 (Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 95-2074) (describing the RFRA as "a substantive 
expansion" and "an assignment by Congress of a higher value to free-exercise-secured 
freedoms than the value assigned by the courts") (emphasis added). 
Moreover, there is also in Professor Robin-Vergeer's formulation another question 
also too smoothly glossed over, namely, just what the "values" thus "augmented" are. 
These "values" may be merely in the beholder'S own eye. What one person sees as the 
appropriate "accommodation" of "religious needs" by civil authority, others may equally 
well see (and be quite as correct in doing so) as the mere special privileging of those no 
more burdened by laws than anyone else, yet expecting and receiving privileged treat-
ment. Which "values," then, does the RFRA "augment"? 
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Or, if this seems somehow too strong, playing false to the more 
modest claim, then put it this way: 
The Congress shall have power to enact legislation augmenting 
constitutional values it imputes to this article, and have such 
values as thus "augmented" by act of Congress applied as su-
preme law to regulate and to limit the states.87 
If Section 5 read this way, even the first way, or if Section 5 were 
even meant to be understood in this way (though it does not say 
so), one might agree that the RFRA might be valid.ss It does not 
read this way, however, nor does it even suggest the thought. And 
again, if it did, if one encountered it for the first time as a seri-
ously proposed amendment, one would surely raise some critical 
and serious questions, would one not? 
E. 
Still, to be sure, one can admit the Court itself may neverthe-
less interpolate such language (or invent such an "understanding") 
into the clause if it wishes; just as it may accept for itself a subor-
dinate or even a sycophant role to Congress,S9 and further aban-
don federalism review.90 It may do so, that is, despite the firm 
evidence that it was just this sort of substantive constitutional 
review (i.e., federalism review) that was most expected of the Su-
preme Court. It is-it was even91 in Morgan itself-largely a con-
87. (Though not to limit itself, except to such extent as Congress shall itself decide. 
See supra note 56 for a review of this self-exempting feature of the RFRA.) 
88. However, one says ''might'' (rather than "would") advisedly, because, of course, 
the RFRA does not necessarily rest on any actual view of Congress regarding the Four-
teenth Amendment or of any of its provisions at all. It may rest, rather, merely on what 
Congress preferred from an enthusiasm of its own: to preferentially befriend "religion," 
moved merely, as Congress so often appears to be moved, by the most ordinary and 
usual politics of the day and nothing more sublime. There is nothing to suggest that 
Congress even inquired into the particular provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
fashioning the RFRA. 
89. Which, unquestionably, sustaining the RFRA would clearly signal-for the Act 
makes no bones about its claim of entitlement to set aside the finality of Supreme Court 
adjudications of constitutional clauses, asserting an entitlement to substitute its own. 
90. In some measure, no doubt, the Court has already done this, moreover, begin-
ning with Katzenbach v. Morgan-although never in the sweeping manner and never to 
the degree so subordinating of the Court as that reflected in the RFRA. See Katzenbach 
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966). 
91. And one says "even" advisedly; the act of Congress involved in Morgan did not 
involve nearly the breadth of Congress' claim as now asserted in the RFRA. See supra 
notes 50-62 and accompanying text. 
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stitutional tour de force scarcely anyone on the Court other than 
Justice Harlan found troubling.92 It was merely consistent with 
Justice Brennan's and others' general disposition to denigrate fed-
eralism review.93 
This view of Section 5, permitting Congress to "reverse" the 
Court's Fourteenth Amendment decisions, however, was quite ade-
quately disposed of by Bickel himself, in his review of Morgan, 
three decades ago.94 "Nothing is clearer about the history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment," he wrote, "than that its framers rejected 
the option of an open-ended grant of power to Congress to med-
dle with conditions \vithin the states so as to render them equal in 
accordance with its own notions." Rather, he noted, "the framers 
chose to write an amendment empowering Congress only to rectify 
inequalities put into effect by the states. Hence the power of Con-
gress comes into play only when the precondition of a denial of 
equal protection of the laws by a state has been met.,,95 
Bickel frankly expressed surprise at the Court's "abdication" 
of its proper judicial function even in the lesser degree reflected in 
Morgan itself. Still, at the time, he managed to conclude on a 
suitably professional and cautious note. "One doubts," he wrote, 
"that a new trend has really been inaugurated.,,96 Three decades 
later, the Court having quite carelessly offered Congress encour-
agement to deem itself nearly unlimited in constitutional authority, 
it seems clear that some kind of trend was inaugurated. And so 
the question now, as the RFRA wends its way through the federal 
court system, is whether it has any end. 
92. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (excerpted supra at text 
accompanying note 63). 
93. See, e.g., Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 
(1985). This disposition is shared even now, perhaps, by four members of the current 
Court. See, e.g., the dissenting opinions in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), 
and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
94. See Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, supra note 20, at 95-102. 
95. Id. at 97. 
96. Id. at 102. 
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APPENDIX 
THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REsTORATION Acr 
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994) 
[Vol. 46:291 
§ 2000bb. Congressional findings and declaration of purposes 
(a) Findings 
The Congress finds that-
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exer-
cise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection 
in the First Amendment to the Constitution; 
(2) laws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious 
exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious 
exercise; 
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious 
exercise without compelling justification; 
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) 
the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that 
the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed 
by laws neutral toward religion; and 
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Feder-
al court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balanc-
es between religious liberty and competing prior governmental 
interests. 
(b) Purposes 
The purposes of this chapter are-
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in 
all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially bur-
dened; and 
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose reli-
gious exercise is substantially burdened by government. 
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§ 2000bb-l. Free exercise of religion protected 
(a) In general 
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise 
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general appli-
cability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) Exception 
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of 
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to 
the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental inter-
est; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that com-
pelling governmental interest. 
(c) Judicial relief 
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in viola-
tion of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense 
in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a 
government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this sec-
tion shall be governed by the general rules of standing under 
article III of the Constitution. 
§ 2000bb-2. Definitions 
As used in this chapter-
(1) the term "government" includes a branch, department, 
agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting 
under color of law) of the United States, a State, or a sub-
division of a State; 
(2) the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each territory and 
possession of the United States; " 
(3) the term "demonstrates" means meets the burdens of 
going forward with the evidence and of persuasion; and 
(4) the term "exercise of religion" means the exercise of 
religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution. 
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§ 2000bb-3. Applicability 
(a) In general 
This chapter applies to all Federal and State law, and the 
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and 
whether adopted before or after November 16, 1993. 
(b) Rule of construction 
Federal statutory law adopted after November 16, 1993, is 
subject to this chapter unless such law explicitly excludes such 
application by reference to this chapter. 
(c) Religious belief unaffected 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize any 
government to burden any religious belief. 
§ 2000bb-4. Establishment clause unaffected 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect, interpret, 
or in any way address that portion of the First Amendment pro-
hibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion (referred to 
in this section as the "Establishment Clause"). Granting govern-
ment funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible 
under the Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a violation of 
this chapter. As used in this section, the term "granting", used 
with respect to government funding, benefits, or exemptions, does 
not include the denial of government funding, benefits, or exemp-
tions. 
